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Abstract
Incorrect beliefs about the properties of memory have broad implications: The media conflate normal forgetting and
inadvertent memory distortion with intentional deceit, juries issue verdicts based on flawed intuitions about the accuracy
and confidence of testimony, and students misunderstand the role of memory in learning. We conducted a large
representative telephone survey of the U.S. population to assess common beliefs about the properties of memory.
Substantial numbers of respondents agreed with propositions that conflict with expert consensus: Amnesia results in the
inability to remember one’s own identity (83% of respondents agreed), unexpected objects generally grab attention
(78%), memory works like a video camera (63%), memory can be enhanced through hypnosis (55%), memory is
permanent (48%), and the testimony of a single confident eyewitness should be enough to convict a criminal defendant
(37%). This discrepancy between popular belief and scientific consensus has implications from the classroom to the
courtroom.
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Introduction
Do people think that memory works like a video camera? Do
they believe that memories are immutable once they are formed?
Answers to questions like these have important ramifications for
psychologists and for the legal system. The ‘‘beyond the ken’’
standard [1] for admitting expert testimony in courts requires that
experts provide information that goes beyond what jurors already
know. If people generally understand how memory works, and
common sense is consistent with expert consensus, then courtroom
testimony by psychologists about memory may be unnecessary [1].
However, if popular beliefs contradict what science knows to be
true, then memory experts will have an important role in
educating juries, judges, lawyers, and the public about the
properties of memory.
People often dismiss behavioral science research as merely
recapitulating common sense, but many important psychological
findings are counterintuitive. Some of the most striking discrep-
ancies between popular intuitions and established science come
from the study of memory. When people recall an emotionally
charged event, they believe that their vivid memories are precise
and accurate, largely because they rarely encounter evidence for
distortions in their own memories. The surprise people express
when they first realize how easily they can miss changes in their
environment [2] or when they fail to notice when a person in a
gorilla suit unexpectedly appears in a video [3] reflects incorrect
underlying beliefs about the completeness of visual encoding, the
richness of visual representations, and the exhaustiveness of visual
awareness [4,5].
Although several studies have documented the pervasiveness of
mistaken beliefs about memory in the laboratory and classroom
[5,6], only a few studies have examined the prevalence of mistaken
intuitions about memory in the broader population. In one study,
students and jury pool members underestimated the influence of
factors known to affect eyewitness accuracy, including the status of
the person providing post-event suggestions, the age of the witness,
the delay between the original event and recall, and the impact of
providing warnings about potentially misleading suggestions [7].
In another study, jury pool participants were also found to hold
mistaken beliefs about memory, lending support to the idea that
members of the public do not concur with the expert consensus
view of memory [8]. In contrast, a series of surveys using
convenience samples of the general public in Vancouver, Canada
shopping malls suggested relatively good agreement with expert
consensus about eyewitness accuracy [9].
To our knowledge, only one large-scale study of the general
public has examined beliefs about the properties of memory [1].
That study examined how well prospective jurors in the
Washington, DC jury pool understood the results of memory
research about eyewitness testimony. Although this jury-pool
survey focused mostly on beliefs about factors influencing
eyewitness memory, it included some true/false items about the
nature, precision, and permanence of memory. For example, one
item stated, ‘‘The act of remembering a traumatic event is like a
video recording in that one can recall details as if they had been
imprinted or burned into one’s brain.’’ The survey recorded high
rates of incorrect responses to these items, suggesting that many
potential jurors misunderstand the properties of memory.
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properties of memory more broadly. And all previous studies were
limited in sample size, geography, and/or demographic represen-
tativeness. Here we report the results of the first large-scale,
nationally representative survey designed to measure intuitive
beliefs about the properties of memory. Our study is not a general
survey of misconceptions about all aspects of human behavior. Nor
is it an exhaustive survey of beliefs about memory. Although we
also asked about a variety of beliefs about the mind, here we report
on a subset of the questions that focused on beliefs about memory.
These items were selected because we expected that they might
reveal a divergence between expert consensus and commonly held
beliefs and because they hold both theoretical and practical
significance.
Methods
Subjects
We hired SurveyUSA to poll a nationally representative sample
of the United States population during a one-week period in June
2009 (the ‘‘public sample’’). Each of the 1838 respondents was
assigned a weight based on the Census-derived U.S. population
demographics for sex, region, age, and race to produce a nominal,
demographically-representative sample size of 1500 people
(Table 1). Respondents also reported their education, income
level, number of psychology courses ever taken, and number of
psychology books read in the past three years. This research was
conducted with the approval of the IRB of the University of Illinois
(protocol #09714). All data were collected anonymously, and the
study conformed to the guidelines and principles of the
Declaration of Helsinki. The protocol was given a waiver of
consent given that it is an anonymous survey.
Survey items
The survey began with the following script: ‘‘This is
SurveyUSA, conducting a short opinion survey that will help
scientists better understand how the brain works. We don’t need
your name, and everything you tell us is confidential. To start,
press 1. [if no response, continue after 5 seconds] This is the
opinion research company SurveyUSA calling to include you in
scientific research about how the mind and brain work. There is
no cost, we do not need your name, and everything you tell us is
confidential. You’ll be on the phone for just a few minutes. To
start, press 1 on your touchtone phone, now.’’ After subjects
pressed 1, the script continued, ‘‘Great, let’s get started.’’ For each
item, subjects were asked to respond ‘‘strongly agree,’’ ‘‘mostly
agree,’’ ‘‘mostly disagree,’’ ‘‘strongly disagree,’’ or ‘‘don’t know’’
using the keys on their phone.
The survey consisted of 16 substantive statements followed by
demographic questions. The survey items were based on similar
items in a number of sources (e.g., [1,5,6,10,11]) and were chosen
because they would measure what we anticipated would be
widespread misconceptions. Each statement was worded to be
inconsistent with the scientific consensus, so that the percentage of
respondents agreeing would reflect the percentage of the public
holding a mistaken belief.
Items were worded to be interpreted consistently by experts and
laypeople, and were reviewed by SurveyUSA to ensure compre-
hensibility. The script was written at a 7th-grade reading level. We
deliberately chose items for which we expected a discrepancy
between scientific consensus and popular belief, so our results
should not be taken to indicate the full scope of psychological
understanding by the general public.
Here we report results for six items related to beliefs about the
properties of memory (see Table 2). Other survey items addressed
beliefs about other topics in psychology (e.g., the myth that people
use only 10% of their brain, the belief that you can feel someone
staring at the back of your head, the idea that listening to Mozart
increases IQ, etc.), and the data from these are not reported here.
The memory items were interspersed among the other items.
Procedure
Respondents were selected using random-digit dialing of
landline phone numbers within area codes that represented all
regions of the United States. Approximately 42.4% of the 79,014
attempted calls were answered by a human being who responded
Table 1. Analyses of memory knowledge as a function of
demographic measures for public sample respondents.
Category [test statistic] Subcategory
%o f
Sample
Average #
correct
(out of 6)
Age [t(1496) =3.71, p,.001] ,50 years 56.7 2.50
$50 years 43.3 2.21
Gender [t(1496) =0.75, p=.453.] Male 48.3 2.40
Female 51.7 2.34
Race [F(4,1493)=3.88, p=.004] Hispanic 11.0 2.22
Black 11.1 2.02
White 72.0 2.43
Asian 1.4 2.59
Other 4.5 2.58
Education [F(3,1483)=27.22, p,.001] Grad School 18.6 2.90
College Grad 17.5 2.50
Some College 40.9 2.34
No College 22.9 1.88
Income [F(2,1429)=25.80, p,.001] ,$40K 36.3 2.06
$40K–$80K 36.7 2.44
.$80K 25.3 2.74
Region [F(3,1494)=2.28, p=.077] Northeast 19.4 2.38
Midwest 22.7 2.36
South 35.7 2.27
West 22.3 2.54
Psychology Books [F(3,149)=5.38,
p = .001]
0 40.3 2.30
1 21.4 2.18
2 17.3 2.59
3+ 21.1 2.53
Psychology Classes [F(3,149) =
14.33, p,.001]
0 37.3 2.21
1 18.6 2.08
2 16.2 2.52
3+ 27.9 2.70
The percentages for sex, race, and age (older/younger than 50) resulting from
the weighting process are matched to U.S. Census values. After weighting the
nominal sample size is 1500 respondents. The percentages for education,
income, number of psychology books read, and number of psychology classes
taken were measured but not used to determine sampling weights. Note that
some subjects declined to answer the income question (4.4%) and the
education question (0.07%).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022757.t001
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in a completed survey (thus, 2.3% of all dialed numbers yielded a
completed survey). SurveyUSA uses ‘‘robotic polling,’’ a technique
in which the recorded voice of a female announcer reads each
statement and respondents press keys on their telephone to
answer. Robotic polling provides a more consistent subject
experience than live-operator polling because each participant
hears the statements in the same voice, regardless of their own
race, income, ethnicity, region, etc. People may also be less
affected by social demands when responding to a recorded voice
than a person. The relatively low response and completion rates
are fairly typical for robotic polling, but low response rates are not
indicative of inaccurate polls. Robotic polls with comparable
response rates have been among the most accurate political polls
in recent election cycles (see www.fivethirtyeight.com for detailed
analyses of polling accuracy).
Expert validation
We confirmed the expert consensus for our survey items by
polling attendees at a session on meta-memory at the 2010
meeting of the Psychonomic Society (the ‘‘expert sample’’). Before
the session started, we distributed 200 single-page surveys which
we then collected before our presentation. This survey included
just the six memory items and gave participants the same five
response options (except that ‘‘Don’t Know’’ was relabeled ‘‘Don’t
Know/Unclear’’). Respondents also reported their academic
status (professor, postdoc, grad student, undergrad, other),
indicated whether they conduct research on memory (yes or no),
and—if yes—for how long they have done so (0–5, 5–10, or .10
years).
A total of 73 attendees (27 faculty, 9 postdocs, 26 graduate
students, 3 undergraduates, and 1 research scientist) completed
surveys prior to the presentation. To ensure that our validation
was based on a truly expert consensus, we restricted our
expert sample to professors with more than 10 years of memory
research experience. (As shown in Table 2, though, the full sample
of 73 respondents produced the same response pattern as the
experts.)
Results and Discussion
All summary statistics (e.g., percent agreement) and analyses
were conducted by weighting each respondent in the public
sample to account for over- or under-sampling of their
demographic group. Only respondents who completed all the
substantive questions as well as the demographic questions about
their sex, race, and age were included in the analyses because
those responses were needed to weight the respondent’s answers
appropriately. Non-responses to the remaining demographic
questions were treated as missing data.
For simplicity of analysis and interpretation, we combined
‘‘strongly agree’’ and ‘‘mostly agree responses’’ into an ‘‘agree’’
category and did the same for ‘‘disagree’’ responses. Given that
subjects could respond ‘‘don’t know’’ to any substantive question,
agree or disagree responses presumably represent respondents’
Table 2. Statements used and percentage of respondents giving each response, with the expert (N=16) and the full
Psychonomics sample (N=73) percentages given for comparison.
Statement Group
Strongly
Agree
Mostly
Agree
Mostly
Disagree
Strongly
Disagree
Don’t
Know
Amnesia: People suffering from amnesia typically cannot recall their own name or
identity.
Public 47.8 34.9 10.1 3.7 3.7
Experts 0.0 0.0 12.5 87.5 0.0
Psychonomics 0.0 1.4 31.5 57.5 9.6
Confident testimony: In my opinion, the testimony of one confident eyewitness
should be enough evidence to convict a defendant of a crime.
Public 11.2 25.9 35.1 24.7 3.1
Experts 0.0 0.0 6.2 93.8 0.0
Psychonomics 0.0 0.0 11.0 87.7 1.4
Video memory: Human memory works like a video camera, accurately recording
the events we see and hear so that we can review and inspect them later.
Public 23.9 39.1 23.4 11.3 2.4
Experts 0.0 0.0 6.2 93.8 0.0
Psychonomics 0.0 0.0 2.7 97.3 0.0
Hypnosis: Hypnosis is useful in helping witnesses accurately recall details of crimes. Public 15.0 39.6 26.9 10.4 8.1
Experts 0.0 0.0 18.8 68.8 12.5
Psychonomics 0.0 0.0 15.1 69.9 15.1
Unexpected events: People generally notice when something unexpected enters
their field of view, even when they’re paying attention to something else.
Public 27.2 50.3 18.3 2.1 2.1
Experts 0.0 18.8 31.2 50.0 0.0
Psychonomics 2.7 15.1 35.6 43.8 2.7
Permanent memory: Once you have experienced an event and formed a memory
of it, that memory does not change.
Public 16.5 31.1 34.7 14.1 3.6
Experts 0.0 0.0 0.0 93.8 6.2
Psychonomics 0.0 0.0 6.8 91.8 1.4
Each question has been given a short label (in bold) for ease of exposition in the text. Numbers corresponding to each item for the public sample represent the
percentage of the weighted respondents giving each response.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022757.t002
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responses out of six possible responses (Median =0, SD =0.63);
only 5.3% of subjects gave more than one ‘‘don’t know’’ response,
and 84.7% did not use this option at all. The average ‘‘don’t
know’’ response rate across items was 4.2% (SD =2.2%, range
=2.1–8.1%). The overall means for each item reflect the
percentage of ‘‘agree’’ responses in the entire sample of 1500
respondents, including those who said ‘‘don’t know.’’ The analyses
and means for subgroups (e.g., different levels of education)
exclude ‘‘don’t know’’ responses. Consequently, those percentages
represent the number of ‘‘agree’’ responses among those subjects
who gave either an ‘‘agree’’ or ‘‘disagree’’ response (see Table 3).
For all but one of the six statements, education was negatively
correlated with agreement: Respondents with more education
were less likely to ‘‘agree’’ (see Table 3). However, in all cases,
substantial percentages of even the most educated respondents
(graduate education) still agreed with the statement.
Across all six items, an average of 60.4% of respondents agreed
with statements that the expert sample almost uniformly rejected.
In other words, fewer than 40% of the responses agreed with the
scientific consensus. More than half of respondents disagreed with
the expert consensus on four or more items, and only 1.5% of
subjects matched the experts on all six items (see Table 4). As for
any survey item, it is possible to conceive of circumstances or
special situations in which an item might be true (for discussion,
see the caveats section at the end of the results). The uniformity of
the expert responses to our survey suggests that experts agree on
the most straightforward interpretation of each of our items item.
And, the consistent differences between expert responses and those
of our survey respondents highlights the discrepancy between
expert consensus and common beliefs. Below we provide the
results for each item separately, followed by a discussion of
demographic trends in responding.
Amnesia: 82.7% of respondents agreed that ‘‘people
suffering from amnesia typically cannot recall their own
name or identity.’’ All 16 experts disagreed.
The form of amnesia that most typically results from brain
injury involves the loss of the ability to form and consolidate new
long-term memories (e.g., [12]). Agreement with this statement
perhaps best exemplifies the pervasive influence of popular media
portrayals of amnesia. Although a few movies come close to an
Table 3. Percentage of public sample agreeing with each statement, by level of education reported.
Statement
No college
(N=342)
Some College
(N=610)
College
Graduate
(N=261)
Graduate
School
(N=277) Linear contrast
Amnesia: People suffering from amnesia typically cannot
recall their own name or identity.
87.4 87.4 87.8 78.8 t(1431)=2.8, p=.005
Confident testimony: In my opinion, the testimony of one
confident eyewitness should be enough evidence to convict a
defendant of a crime.
48.0 40.7 35.6 24.7 t(1439)=6.7, p,.001
Video memory: Human memory works like a video camera,
accurately recording the events we see and hear so that we can
review and inspect them later.
78.2 69.4 55.6 46.7 t(1450)=9.1, p,.001
Permanent memory: Once you have experienced an event
and formed a memory of it, that memory does not change.
64.9 47.4 43.4 40.6 t(1431)=6.0, p,.001
Hypnosis: Hypnosis is useful in helping witnesses accurately
recall details of crimes.
68.4 59.9 56.6 50.2 t(1365)=4.4, p,.001
Unexpected events: People generally notice when something
unexpected enters their field of view, even when they’re paying
attention to something else.
83.5 76.1 78.0 82.9 t(1453)=0.0, p=.996
The parentheses under each education category show the weighted number of respondents out of the 1490 who answered the education item (the equivalent of 10
weighted participants did not answer this item).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022757.t003
Table 4. Percentage of subjects giving each number of correct responses (out of six possible correct answers).
# of ‘‘disagree’’ responses % of public sample % of expert sample (N=16)
% of full Psychonomics
Sample (N=73) Binomial Probability
0 (all incorrect) 10.8 0.0 0.0 1.6
1 18.1 0.0 0.0 9.4
2 27.8 0.0 0.0 23.4
3 19.6 0.0 0.0 31.2
4 15.2 6.2 11.0 23.4
5 6.9 25.0 27.4 9.4
6 (all correct) 1.5 68.8 61.6 1.6
Binomial probability gives the odds of getting that many correct if chance is 50% on any given item.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022757.t004
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consolidate new memories (e.g., Memento), most depict amnesia as
something more like a much rarer fugue state in which someone
cannot remember who they are and suddenly take leave of their
home and work (e.g., The Bourne Identity, or the documentary
Unknown White Male). The persistence of this factual misunder-
standing despite more than half a century of research on the
mechanisms of memory loss reveals a need for better popular
outreach to explain the deficits that can result from brain injury.
Confident Testimony: 37.1% agreed that ‘‘in my opinion,
the testimony of one confident eyewitness should be
enough evidence to convict a defendant of a crime.’’ All
16 experts disagreed.
The link between confidence and accuracy in eyewitness
testimony is more complex than typically presented in psychology
textbooks. You are more likely to be accurate when you are more
confident in your memory than when you are less confident [13].
However, the link between confidence and accuracy across
individuals is more tenuous [14], in part because people differ in
their baseline levels of expressed confidence [15]. Consequently,
most memory experts agree that an isolated expression of
confidence is at best a limited predictor of memory accuracy
[14,16,17]. When people are wrongly convicted of crimes and
later exonerated by DNA testing, the primary evidence often came
in the form of a confident, but faulty, eyewitness identification
[18,19]. Lawyers and judges need to be aware that a sizeable
minority of a typical jury pool likely misunderstands the fallibility
of eyewitness testimony and may rely too heavily on confident
witness statements.
Video Memory: 63.0% agreed that ‘‘human memory
works like a video camera, accurately recording the
events we see and hear so that we can review and
inspect them later.’’ All 16 experts disagreed.
This statement incorporates several erroneous beliefs. First, the
idea that memory works like a video camera implies a level of
completeness and accessibility of our representations that is
inconsistent with known limits on visual perception and attention
[2,20]. Second, video recording implies a passive process in which
the visual world is imprinted into memory. But decades of research
have documented the influences of stored information on encoding
and memory, arguing against the idea that memories are pure,
bottom-up records [21,22]; what is encoded depends on top-down
goals and expectations. Finally, the idea that memory retrieval is
akin to rewinding and replaying a tape contradicts the well-
established idea that memory retrieval is a constructive process
influenced by knowledge, beliefs, expectations, and schemas
[22,23].
This belief is perhaps the most relevant to the role of expert
testimony on memory in legal cases. If jurors believe that memory
works like a video camera, they will be more likely to trust
witnesses who saw an event without realizing that different people
may encode the same event differently or that memory can be
distorted by subsequent events.
Permanent Memory: 47.6% agreed that ‘‘once you have
experienced an event and formed a memory of it, that
memory does not change.’’ 15 experts disagreed and 1
responded ‘‘Don’t Know/Unclear.’’
Even those believing in a permanent memory trace (with failed
recall resulting from interference) acknowledge that the trace could
be strengthened or weakened based on later experiences [21].
Consistent with the idea that people interpret this statement as
reflecting the permanence and immutability of memory, responses
to this question were correlated with responses to the video memory
item (r=.36); people who endorsed the idea of video memory were
more likely to endorse the idea of permanent memory (see Table 5).
Hypnosis: 55.4% agreed that ‘‘hypnosis is useful in
helping witnesses accurately recall details of crimes.’’ 14
experts disagreed and 2 responded ‘‘Don’t Know/
Unclear.’’
Although hypnosis canlead to morerecall by encouraging people
to adopt a more lenient criterion [24], it does not lead to more
accurate recall (for overviews see [25,26]). The popular support for
hypnosis is somewhat surprising given the degree to which the
courts already treat hypnosis-based recollections as untrustworthy.
A largerproportion ofthe publicsampleresponded‘‘don’tknow’’to
this question than any of the other ones, perhaps reflecting a greater
degree of uncertainty about how hypnosis works.
Unexpected Events: 77.5% agreed that ‘‘people generally
notice when something unexpected enters their field of
view, even when they’re paying attention to something
else.’’ 13 experts disagreed and 3 agreed.
Although a number of studies have revealed the failure to notice
unexpected events when attention is focused on something else
Table 5. Pearson correlations among survey items for the public sample.
Amnesia
Confident
Testimony Video Memory
Permanent
Memory Hypnosis Unexpected Events
Amnesia 1
Confident Testimony r=.046{ (N=1403) 1
Video Memory r=.125 (N=1403) r=.213 (N=1426) 1
Permanent Memory r=.157 (N=1402) r=.109 (N=1407) r=.364 (N=1419) 1
Hypnosis r=.128 (N=1341) r=.109 (N=1345) r=.180 (N=1354) r=.168 (N=1356) 1
Unexpected Events r=.084 (N=1419) r=.060* (N=1428) r=.127 (N=1442) r=.155 (N=1424) r=.077** (N=1357) 1
‘‘Don’t know’’ responses were treated as missing data. All correlations were significant at p,.001 unless otherwise noted:
{p,.10.
*p,.05.
**p,.01.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022757.t005
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with which unexpected events are noticed in general, a fact that
might explain why three experts agreed. Note that there still is a
large disparity between the expert sample (81% disagree) and the
public sample (77.5% agree) about what captures attention.
Although on its surface, this item appears to focus on attention
rather than memory, events can only be incorporated into explicit
memory if they are noticed, and attention plays a central role in
the encoding process. Agreement with the statement is consistent
with evidence that undergraduates believe salient events will draw
attention even when people are focused on other attention-
demanding tasks [5], and it might partly explain why people often
are surprised by demonstrations of inattentional blindness [3].
If juries and lawyers believe that a suspect ‘‘should have’’
noticed some event, they will tend to see claims of ignorance as
deliberate attempts to deceive (see [29,30,31] for examples).
Notably, unlike the other memory statements, agreement with this
statement was not associated with increasing education (Table 3).
Demographic analyses
To analyze which demographic measures are associated with
mistaken beliefs, we computed a general memory knowledge index
as [6 – (# of ‘‘agree’’ responses)]. Given that the items were not
chosen to encompass the full range of memory processes, the
memory knowledge index reflects only the prevalence of these
particular mistaken beliefs. The items were not chosen to tap a
single construct of memory knowledge, and they were not highly
inter-correlated (see Table 5; Cronbach’s alpha =.49; mean inter-
item r=.14).
Unsurprisingly given the large size of the public sample, general
memory knowledge varied significantly among subgroups of
almost all the demographic variables, but all subgroups agreed,
on average, with more than half of the statements (Table 1).
Increased education was associated with better knowledge, linear
contrast: t(1483)=8.9, p,.001. Respondents with post-college
education outperformed those with college degrees or some college
experience, who in turn outperformed those with no college (all
pairwise comparisons are significant by Scheffe ´ test at p,.05).
Because education is likely correlated with other individual
differences such as socioeconomic status and intelligence, this
association does not provide causal evidence that education
increases understanding of how memory works.
Specific background in psychology, as measured by the number
of psychology books read, was associated with better knowledge as
well, linear contrast: t(1494)=3.3, p=.001. Those people who had
read 2 or 3+ psychology books outperformed those who had just
read 1 book, although those reading no books were not different
from the other groups. Note that the survey did not constrain what
counts as a psychology book, so this variable might not reflect
knowledge of scientific psychology. The number of psychology
classes taken also had a significant linear effect: t(1494)=6.2,
p,.001. Those who took 3+ psychology courses outperformed
those who took just 2 classes, and both of those groups
outperformed those who took 1 course or no courses. Again,
these associations do not permit causal conclusions, but they are
consistent with the idea that learning about psychology improves
understanding of memory.
Caveats
Our results should be considered in light of several caveats.
First, we treat the current expert consensus as accurate, while
acknowledging that expert opinion can change over time. For
example, in the 1970s, emotionally charged events or ‘‘flashbulb’’
memories were thought to be accurately recorded and recalled
[32,33], whereas experts now understand that even vivid
memories can be distorted. We assume that the current consensus
reflects the substantial accumulation of evidence over recent
decades rather than shifts in fashion.
Second, we assume that our public sample accurately reflects
the beliefs of the American public even though our response and
compliance rates were relatively low (albeit typical for robotic
polling). Any survey with a response rate lower than 100% risks
sampling an unusual subset of the target population—those who
willingly respond to phone surveys may differ systematically from
the remainder of the population. This critique applies to all polling
methodologies because it is impossible to measure the beliefs of
people who refuse to respond. SurveyUSA’s record of reliable and
valid prediction in its political polling suggests that their methods
accurately sample public opinion despite relatively low response
rates. And the demographics of our sample were weighted to
match the United States census, so our survey is representative in
its final sampling (more so than almost any other experimental
method, especially those that use convenience samples of
undergraduates; see [34] for discussion of the representativeness
problem). More importantly, a number of survey firms have
examined the predictive validity of their polling as a function of
response rate by taking extraordinary measures to increase the
response rate (e.g., by repeatedly calling or visiting the same home
over a two-month period). The consistent result across those
studies is that increasing the response rate does not increase the
reliability or predictive validity of survey results [35].
Third, for almost any statement of fact, experts can imagine a
context that would make the statement true rather than false. For
example, a single confident witness might provide enough
evidence for conviction if the witness happened to know the
accused before seeing the crime or if the witness had extensive
opportunities to observe the suspect. Constructing statements of
fact that could not be interpreted differently under any set of
assumptions would require so many hedges and qualifications that
the item likely would not convey the intended meaning (or even be
intelligible) to laypeople. We worded our items so that the most
straightforward interpretation would be false, and the uniformity
of our expert consensus suggests that the intended interpretation of
our items was clear.
Finally, all of our items were worded as positive statements, and
people might have felt some pressure to agree with some of the
items, thereby inflating agreement rates. However, robotic polling
decreases the usual social demand to agree with the (nonexistent)
‘‘person conducting the study.’’ Furthermore, the availability of
four levels of agreement, as well as a ‘‘don’t know’’ option, should
minimize a default tendency to agree. And, with negative wording,
some of our items would be nonsensical or would not represent
facts about the mind. Finally, given the high rates of agreement we
find for many of our items, bias alone is unlikely to explain large
deviations from 0% agreement—the expected rate if people fully
understand the properties of memory.
Conclusion
Each of the beliefs documented in this survey runs counter to
expert scientific consensus and reflects a fundamental misunder-
standing of the way that memory works. In a sense, the results of
this survey are disappointing: Many of the ideas we tested refer to
scientific findings that have been established for decades. This
discrepancy between science and popular beliefs confirms the
danger of relying on intuition or common sense when evaluating
claims about psychology and the mind [30,36,37]. Accordingly,
scientists should more vigorously communicate established and
uncontroversial results (alongside new and surprising findings) in a
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also be cognizant that many of their students come to the
classroom with basic misconceptions about psychology.
The prevalence of mistaken beliefs in the general public implies
that similar misunderstandings likely are common among jurors
[8] and could well lead to flawed analyses of testimony that
involves memory. At least for these basic properties of memory,
commonsense intuitions are more likely to be wrong than right.
Expert testimony on these issues could well help to overcome such
misinterpretations (although see [38]), and at a minimum, it could
make jurors aware of some of the limitations of memory. Future
research should examine how people acquire faulty intuitions
about memory and why those intuitions persist in the face of
contradictory scientific evidence.
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